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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOGAN F. CARR, individually and 
LOGAN F. CARR, as Guardian Ad Lit-
em for JEFF L. CARR, a minor, 
s-A ppellants, 
v. 
BRADSHAW CHEVROLET C 0 M -
PANY, a Utah Corporation, and COL-
LINS ROWLEY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11774 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of a collision involving a bicycle and an automobile; 
the minor plaintiff was riding the bicycle which collided 
with the automobile owned by defendant, Bradshaw 
Chevrolet Company, and driven by Collins Rowley. Col-
lins Rowley was not served with process and is not 
before the court at this time. Logan F. Carr brings 
this action as Guardian Ad Litem for the minor, Jeff 
L. Carr, to recover damages for personal injuries. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant motioned for summary judgment con-
tending that Jeff L. Carr was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. The Trial Court found in favor of 
defendant and dismissed the complaint of Plaintiffs 
with prejudice, upon the merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Trial Court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 10 :00 A.M. on the 5th day of September, 1964, 
Jeff L. Carr left his home for the purpose of going 
downtown and purchasing supplies for a school project. 
He was riding his bicycle at this time and turned onto 
the sidewalk adjacent to the east side of the Cedar City 
main street, approximately three blocks south of the 
site of the accident concerned herein. He then proceed-
ed north on said street in a normal ordinary manner. 
(Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, 7, and Affidavit of Jeff 1. 
Carr). 
Jeff L. Carr was eleven years old at this time and 
had been advised to ride his bicycle on the sidewalk when 
traveling on the main street in Cedar City, Utah, which 
advice was communicated to him, both by his parents 
and the then Chief of Police at Cedar City, Utah, in an 
address made by said Chief of Police to the students 
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where Jeff attended school. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, 
6). 
On the main street in Cedar City, Utah, at the time 
of the accident, existed a certain area known as Sul-
livan's Parking Lot, and as Jeff Carr approached the 
driveway of said parking lot, the defendant's automobile 
left said parking area, pulled across the sidewalk and 
stopped on said sidewalk, directly in front of the bi-
cycle ridden by Jeff Carr. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, 
9). At the time of the accident, Sullivan's Parking Lot 
was located on the east side of the Cedar City main 
street and the driveway here concerned ran from the 
main highway to the parking lot. On the south side of 
the parking lot existed a certain block wall approximately 
four feet in height and there was also a hedge immediate-
ly south of said parking lot driveway. (Deposition of 
Byron Keith Anderson, 13, and Deposition of Jeff L. 
Carr, 21). 
On the 5th day of September, Jeff L. Carr was rid-
ing his bicycle on the east sidewalk adjacent to the 
Cedar City main street in a usual, nonnal manner; he 
was going moderately fast, but not too fast; he glanced 
down at intermittent intervals to examine the terrain 
over which he was traveling. (Affidavit of Jeff L. Carr). 
Defendant's automobile pulled out of Sullivan's Park-
ing Lot and stopped directly across the sidewalk but 
Jeff could not stop his bicycle, although he saw the car 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE CAPACITY 
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF, AN ELEVEN YEAR OLD BOY, UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
This case comes to the Supreme Court on a motion 
for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and 
this Court has often stated law similar to that expressed 
in Welchman v. Wood, 9 Ut. 2d 25, 337 P.2d 410, (1959), 
concerning the advisibility of administering such a reme-
dy. 
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and 
courts should be reluctant to deprive1 litigants 
of an opportunity to fully present their con-
tentions upon a trial and therefore, summary 
judgment should be granted only when under the 
facts viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law." 
At the outset consideration should also be given to 
the fact that an eleven year old boy is involved in this 
matter and the requirement is that he exercise that de-
gree of care which would ordinarily be observed by child-
ren of like age, intelligence and experience under similar 
circumstances. Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Ut. 2d. 342, 366 
P.2d 603 (1961), accord Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 
Ut.2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964). 
In addition to the foregoing propositions of law 
account must also be taken of the law which places the 
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burden of showing a child's capacity to be contributorily 
negligent upon the defendant, as set forth in Nels on et 
ux. v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 U. 129, 104 P.2d 225 
(1940), where this Court stated: 
"The question as to whether a child's capacity 
is such that it may be chargeable with contribu-
tory negligence is a question of fact for the jury, 
unless so young and immature as to require the 
court to judicially know that it could not con-
tribute to its own injury or be responsible for its 
acts, or so old and mature that the court must 
know that, though an infant, yet it is responsible. 
Where the infant is under fourteen years of age, 
the burden rests upon the defendant to rebut the 
legal presumption of incapability of contributory 
negligence." 
The foregoing principles of law are combined with 
the further proposition that contributory negligence is 
an affirmative defense and the burden rests upon the 
defendant to prove it by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Stickle v. Union Pac. R. Co., 122 U. 477, 251 P.2d 
867 (1952). All of the above must be overcome by the 
defendant if he is to prevail in this cause and the facts 
herein, combined with said principles of law, illustrate 
decidedly that this case should be submitted to the jury. 
In viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, 
evidence is available which supports a reasonable in-
ference that Jeff L. Carr was not contributorily negli-
gent and such facts should be submitted to the jury for 
its determination. Green v. Higbee, 66 U. 539, 244 P. 906 
(1926) points up this contention. In that case a verdict 
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was directed for the defendant after a trial by jury. 
A small girl under six years old was hit by a car when 
she was attempting to cross a street. Plaintiff's evidence 
showed the small girl and her brother start across the 
street 40 feet in front of the approaching automobile. 
There was other evidence produced by plaintiff which 
indicated the swerving and skidding of the car. This 
evidence conflicted with that of defendant who contended 
that he was driving his car in a safe and reasonable 
manner; that he honked his horn, slackened his speed 
and approached within 20 feet of the small girl, when 
she ran out in front of the car. The trial court conclud-
ed that as a matter of law, defendant was not negligent. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that there was 
sufficient evidence of circumstances from which legiti-
mate inferences might be drawn with respect to the 
speed of the automobile and the control of it to entitle 
the plaintiff to have the question submitted to the jury 
under proper instructions of law. The Court concluded: 
"A verdict should not be directed for def en-
dant, unless all reasonable men would draw the 
same conclusions from the evidence, and that 
conclusion would require a verdict for the de-
fendant." 
In the instant case the question to be determined is 
whether a reasonable boy of like age, intelligence and 
experience would have avoided the collision. The facts, 
when considered in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, are as follows. 
1. Jeff L. Carr, an eleven year old boy, was riding 
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his bicycle on the mam street sidewalk in Cedar City, 
Utah. 
2. He had been advised, by his parents and the then 
chief of police of Cedar City, Utah, to travel the side-
walk when using the main street. 
3. He was traveling moderately fast, not too fast, 
in a usual normal manner. 
4. He was sitting on the bicycle seat, with his hands 
on the handlebars and feet on the footpedals. 
5. Jeff was attentive to the route he was traveling 
and to the intermittent areas of rough terrain, which 
he had notice of because he had previously flattened a 
bicycle tire on similar terrain. 
6. Defendant's automobile pulled quickly out of Sul-
livan's parking lot and stopped suddenly across the side-
walk directly in front of the approaching boy. 
7. Neither of the persons in the car observed Jeff 
riding down the sidewalk. 
8. Jeff glanced down and when he looked up, the 
automobile was directly in front of his path. 
9. He did not have time to stop, although he saw 
the car and applied his brakes. 
10. An alternative path around defendant's vehicle 
was not available. 
11. A collision occured. 
8 
The defendant would disagree with fact number 
five and he would contend that defendant's automobile 
was eased across the sidewalk; however, the evidence of 
plaintiff produces a legitimate inference from which a 
jury could conclude that defendant's automobile pulled 
across the sidewalk at a rapid speed; that Jeff L. Carr, 
although acting in a reasonable and prudent manner, as 
determined by a child of like age, intelligence and ex-
perience, could not avoid the collision. 
When dealing with the contributory negligence of 
one not an adult, the court will generally submit such 
a determination to the jury. The case of Kawaguchi v. 
Bennett, 112 U. 442, 189 P.2d 109 (1948), explains the 
earlier case of Herald v. Smith, 56 U. 304, 190 P. 932 
(1920), concerning that question, in the following man-
ner: 
"We do not understand that we there said 
[Herald v. Smith, sitpra] that as a matter of law 
any child of tender years cannot be guilty of con-
tributory negligence, but rather that a court can-
not say, as a matter of law, that such a child was 
guilty of contributory negligence, but must sub-
mit that question to a jury to determine whether 
the conduct of the child, measured by its capacity 
and experience, was negligent." (emphasis added) 
The advisibility of submitting such a question to the 
jury is summed up nicely in 77 ALR 2d 917, Section 7: 
"Whether the question of a child's contribu-
tory negligence is regarded as one of capacity 
standard of care, or compliance with that stan-




normally, if not always, a question of fact for the 
jury is presented, rather than one of law for the 
court. This conclusion seems to follow almost 
necessarily from the consideration that the an-
swers to the relevant questions involve an investi-
gation of the child's actual development, that is 
of his age, intelligence and experience or educa: 
tion, the formulation of a fictional child having 
the same or similar capacities; and then the de-
termination as to whether the plaintiff's actual 
conduct under the circumstances, often itself a 
matter of dispute, comes up to the standard which 
is expected of his fictional counterpart." 
The burden is on defendant to demonstrate a child's 
capacity to be contributorily negligence and the only 
facts before the trial court were those contained in the 
pleadings, intenogatories and depositions. There were 
no ·witnesses before the court and therefore the demeanor 
of the infant, Jeff L. Carr, was not available to the 
trial judge, who states in his memorandum decision 
that a boy almost 12 years old, who participates in 
athletics and is a straight "A" student, can be contribu-
torily negligent and is contributorily negligent under 
the facts of this case. Plaintiff contends that reasonable 
minds would differ concerning this question; that a boy 
11 years old would not appreciate the existence of Sul-
livans' parking lot driveway in the same manner as an 
adnlt, nor would such a boy necessarily be cognizant 
of the danger involved, if any. The formulation of a fic-
tional child of like age, intelligence and experience in-
terjected into the position of Jeff L. Carr during the 
period of this incident, is necessarily a factual matter 
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to be determined by the jury. All available evidence 
' including the truth, veracity and demeanor of the wit-
nesses is necessary to accomplish such a task. 
Defendant contends that its automobile was eased 
onto the sidewalk from Sullivan's parking lot and stop-
ped; however, it is plaintiff's contention that the auto-
mobile of defendant pulled directly across the sidewalk 
in a rapid manner and stopped abruptly, making it im-
possible for any reasonable boy of Jeff's capacity to 
avoid a collision. Such disputed facts, involving a child 
of eleven years, should be reversed for the jury to de-
termine the truth and veracity of the witnesses, and 
should not be decided on summary judgment. M orby v. 
Rogers, 122 U. 540 252 P.2d 231 (1953). 
POINT II 
DISREGARDING THE INF ANCY OF JEFF L. 
CARR, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETER-
MINING HIS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
Even if Jeff L. Carr is held to an adult standard 
of care, contributory negligence under the facts of this 
case cannot be determined as a matter of law, for the 
reason that a jury could conclude that Jeff was justi-
fied in dividing his attention to include the rough terrain 
of the sidewalk along with the direction in whch his bi-
cycle was proceeding. The case of Hindmarsh v. 0. P. 
Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Ut. 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968), 
dealt with such a question. In that case the plaintiff 
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slipped and fell on a patch of ice in defendant's parking 
lot and the contention was that if plaintiff had watched 
her feet, she would not have stepped on the patch of ice. 
The Court held that contributory negligence in that case 
was grounded on the proposition that plaintiff could 
have seen the spot of ice and avoided it. The court seemed 
to indicate that this might be the correct rule of law, but 
went on to conclude: 
"However, this is subject to the qualification 
that if there is something which justifies plaintiff 
giving part of her attention elsewhere so that in 
the total circumstances it can reasonably be be-
lieved that she exercised due care, the conclusion 
that she was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law is not compelled." 
A reasonable inference exists under the facts of the 
instant case from which a jury could determine that Jeff 
L. Carr acted reasonably in relation to a boy of like 
age, intelligence and experience, when he glanced down 
intermittantly to examine the terrain over which he 
traveled. The jury might also conclude that defendant's 
automobile could not have been eased onto the sidewalk 
in the short period of time taken to glance down and 
then look up to the direction of travel. This proposition 
is especially true when the facts are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding this case, it must be remembered that 
the facts are to be looked at in the light most favorable 
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to the plaintiff; that the burden is on the defendant to 
establish the capacity of a child to be contributorily 
negligent; tliat the burden is on the defendant to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent; and that ordinarily the deter-
mination of a fictional child is in the province of the jury. 
We submit, that under the facts of the instant case, 
defendant has failed to carry his burden in one or more 
of the foregoing propositions. 
The Trial Court erred in deciding, as a matter of 
law, that defendant has established his burden of prov-
ing the capacity of Jeff L. Carr to be contributorily 
negligent and that he was in fact contributorily negligent. 
The facts of this case, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, require their submission to the 
jury. Summary Judgment is not applicable here and the 
decision of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
J. Harlan Burns 
BURNS and PARK 
95 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
and 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HAN-
SEN and HENROID 
410 Newhouse Bu:ilding 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
